Shell vs. Greenpeace: A Sea Change in Negotiation Techniques

Greenpeace gave three reasons for stopping Brent Spar’s deep-water disposal. But it was the group’s last point (that 5,000 tons of waste would spill into the sea) that dominated headlines. The problem with point two – the Precautionary Principle – was its difficulty to understand. In a study of independent Shell and Greenpeace scientists, even they struggled to agree what constitutes harm to the environment. [4] The press did little to explain the policy to the public. ‘5,000 tons’ was a better headline; journalists didn’t investigate the claim and Greenpeace ran with the coverage. Investigators later found the true amount to be 100 tons, after Greenpeace scientists botched their tests. [5] But Shell only discovered this years later, knowledge which may have de-stabilized Greenpeace’s argument. [6] One reason Shell may have failed to counter point one (the precedent claim) was its truth. Shell lobbyists and the UK government were closing in on deals for further deep-sea disposals before the Brent Spar protest broke. [7] Later shown to be inaccurate, the ‘5,000 tons’ claim still shows the power of a single, clear message when negotiating. Especially when using the media to help influence public opinion.

Moral High Ground

It wasn’t only the public who sympathized with Greenpeace. When Shell hit activists with water cannons and rammed their inflatable boats, TV cameras caught it all. This aggressive response attracted support from European governments and opposition parties in Britain. [8] When the UK’s Institute of Public Relations criticized Shell for its aggression, the oil giant dismissed its comments and started to tow the rig after forcibly removing protestors. Throughout the Brent Spar incident, Shell showed insensitivity to public opinion. [9] Instead, Shell and the UK government turned to the law to back up their actions. As Dr Doug Parr, former chief scientist and policy director for Greenpeace UK, says, “Legal is not necessarily legitimate in the eyes of the population at large – there has to be justification as well as regulatory compliance.” [10]

Fuelling the Flames

Sensationalized news coverage of the Brent Spar incident led to German consumers boycotting Shell service stations in the summer of 1995. Five were firebombed, while another station was hit by a drive-by shooting. Not only did sales plummet by 20%, but vendors demanded compensation from Shell. [11] More European governments joined consumers in condemnation of events – and Shell’s handling of the situation. In June, the oil firm cracked. Facing millions in lost sales and untold public, political and media damage, it released a statement that “strong objections” voiced by “other governments” had placed it in an “untenable position”. [12] Shell did a u-turn and conceded to Greenpeace’s demands to find an alternative to deep-water disposal.

The Science of Negotiation

The scientific community blasted Shell’s u-turn as irrational and bowing to public pressure. [13] Despite the evidence supporting deep-sea disposal, 71% of the UK public at the time thought Shell was wrong. [14] In a 1999 study, 350 university science students were given all the facts (and falsehoods) of the Brent Spar case. But the majority still sided with Greenpeace. The study concluded that Shell’s problem “lay not in the public misperception of the ‘objective’ issues, but in the perception of how the decisions were made”. [15] It was a decision that didn’t involve the public, who scientists deemed irrational, and Shell perceived as irrelevant, with the law on its side.

Sifting for Truth

After news broke of the true amount of waste left in the rig, the media turned on Greenpeace. The brave activists were now portrayed as bumbling terrorists. Greenpeace claimed it was the victim of a “persistent media myth… that [it] had got it wrong over the entire Brent Spar issue”. [16] The Brent Spar incident also brought to light how Shell – and other corporations – lobby governments to pass favorable laws. [17]

Brent Spar Timeline

• February 1995 – At the Oslo Convention, the UK government informs EU leaders of the Brent Spar disposal plan. No governments object.
• April 1995 – Greenpeace activists board the rig.
• Same day – Greenpeace releases a report with alternatives to deep-sea disposal. [18]
• May 1995 – German chancellor Helmut Kohl urges the UK government to stop the Brent Spar plan. [19]
• June 1995 – Consumers boycott Shell stations and sales drop 20% in Germany alone. [20]
• June 1995 – Shell announces it’s dropping the deep-sea disposal plan to seek an alternative.
• August 1995 – At the Edinburgh International Television Festival, media executives acknowledge their unbalanced reporting of the incident. [21]
• September 1995 – Greenpeace apologizes to Shell for publicizing a mistaken estimate of the amount of waste on board Brent Spar, adding, "We're owning up to a minor mistake." [22]
• January 1998 – After discussions between EU leaders, Shell announces a new plan to re-purpose Brent Spar materials to form the base of a new ferry quay at Mekjarvik, Norway.

Negotiation Oil

After Greenpeace took Shell by surprise over Brent Spar, the oil industry now has robust corporate-relation strategies in place to cover issues such as disasters, environmental campaigns and political lobbying. Greenpeace’s victory over Shell reveals these negotiation essentials:

• Know the decision-makers. Shell assumed it only had the UK government to deal with. Greenpeace realized they could reach the public, who, in turn, could sway their governments.
• Respect people’s values. Shell turned to the law and science to advocate its actions. For the public, environmental concerns, and being heard, were more important than laws passed by government. As former Shell director and founder of Amnesty International UK Sir Geoffrey Chandler says, “Protest alone is not enough. You’ve got to engage, understand companies and argue with them about why the values of society are relevant to their business.”
• Find a platform. From the start, Greenpeace was more effective than Shell at getting its message across by using media such as the (then) new world wide web.
• Be clear (and true). The ‘5,000 tons’ message had shock value and resonated because of its simplicity. But the media turned on Greenpeace with the revelation that the figure was wildly inaccurate. The press is accountable to public opinion too.
• Involve the public (where relevant). A report reveals scientists were reluctant to involve the public in the Brent Spar decision because they were “irrational”. [23] It argues that the scientific community must get better at communicating with the public. After the incident, Shell set up the Brent Spar Dialog, which brought together environmental groups, the media, politicians and academics to find a new disposal solution for the rig. [24]

The ripples of Brent Spar still spread. As Andrew Vickers, Shell’s vice-president for policy and external relations, says, “The decision not to sink Brent Spar was ‘a tipping point’ for Shell, NGOs and the media. For Shell, it was about more than Brent Spar. Overplaying the legal card, underestimating the power of modern media tools and not seeing the deeper agenda are challenges that we work hard to address.” [25]